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Abstract 
 
Buddhist philosophers have tried to work out the implications of the Buddha’s teaching of non-self 
(anattā). I characterise the teaching of non-self in the Pāli discourses, noting that, although the 
Buddha denied the existence of a ‘metaphysical’ self, he did not completely deny the ‘everyday’ 
self but presupposed the ‘I’ as a continuously identical moral agent. I go on to explain three 
attempts to explain the Buddha’s teaching. (1) Nāgasena in the Milindapañha uses the chariot 
argument to show that the self, like a chariot, is a conventional designation for a functional 
arrangement of parts. (2) The Yogācāra philosopher Vasubandhu argues that the self is a cognitive 
mistake and that in reality there is only non-dual awareness. (3) The Madhyamaka philosopher 
Candrakīrti argues that there is the appearance of a self but it does not exist in the way that it 
appears. I conclude that these ways of denying the self are distinct and that Candrakīrti’s way seems 
closest to the Buddha’s as recorded in the Pāli canon. 
 
Introduction 
 
In this article I propose to present three different ways in which Buddhist philosophers in India tried 
to work out the implications of the Buddha’s teaching of anattā, or non-self. This teaching is not 
quite a doctrine in the sense of a statement about reality to be accepted as such; it is more like an 
invitation to investigate experience with the help of doctrinal formulations. In the Dhammapada, for 
instance, the third of three stanzas on the three ‘characteristics’ (lakkhaṇas) reads: 
‘All experiences are without self’ –  
seeing this with understanding 
one turns away from suffering.  
This is the path to purity.1 
The sentence ‘all experiences are without self’ is set off here by the quotative particle ti to signify a 
formulation to be born in mind and used in the context of insight meditation, for the sake of 
escaping suffering (dukkha) and finding liberation. 
 But to use this formulation successfully one needs to understand what it means. To say that 
‘experiences are without self (anattā)’, to speak of ‘non-self’ (anattā), is to deny something, 
namely, a self (attan in Pāli, ātman in Sanskrit). To ‘deny’ is to refuse to admit the truth or 
                                                 
1 Dhammapada v.279: sabbe dhammā anattā’ti | yadā paññāya passati | atha nibbindati dukkhe | esa maggo 
visuddhiyā. (All translations from Pāli and Sanskrit are by the author).  
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existence of something, to say ‘no’ (from Latin denegare). In this article I will investigate three 
ways Buddhist thinkers have clarified what it means to deny the self, each of which relies on a 
different conception of what it is that is being denied. Firstly, in the Questions of King Milinda, the 
monk Nāgasena denies the self using the ‘Chariot Argument’. This argument involves the 
comparison of the self or person to a chariot. Just as a chariot is an assembly of parts, such that 
‘chariot’ is merely a name for the assembly of parts, so by analogy the human being is made up of 
the skandhas or constituents, and the ‘self’ is merely a name for those constituents. With the help of 
Candrakīrti, a Mādhyamika or follower of the ‘middle way’, I will argue that this argument denies a 
non-existent metaphysical self and that this denial leaves the everyday sense of self untouched. 
Next, I will turn to the later Vasubandhu, an exponent of Yogācāra, and present his sophisticated 
argument from the Triṃśikā, or Thirty Verses, that denies the ordinary, everyday experiential self 
by showing it to be a cognitive error based on the transformations of consciousness. Finally, I return 
to Candrakīrti, and his argument that, when Buddhists deny the self, they are not saying that the 
experiential self does not exist, nor that it is a cognitive error, but that the self does not exist in the 
way that it appears to exist (that is to say, as existing independently or separately), but that it is 
dependently-arisen. My conclusion will be that I think Candrakīrti has got it right, since his account 
makes most sense of what early Buddhist texts say about non-self.2 
 
Non-Self in the Buddha’s Teaching 
 
One reason that later Buddhists disagreed about what it means to deny the self is that it is not 
entirely clear what the Buddha meant when he did so. As the philosopher Nāgārjuna later put it: 
‘Self’ has been made known and ‘non-self’ has been taught. 
‘Nothing about a self nor a non-self’ has also been taught by the Buddhas.3 
That is to say, the early Buddhist texts appear to record the Buddha affirming that there is a self, 
denying that there is a self, and also saying nothing about whether or not there is a self. The 
contradictions here are, however, apparent more than real, since the Buddha is reported to have 
taught according to person and circumstance. Let us begin our review of early Buddhist teachings 
with the Buddha’s saying nothing.  
 In the discourse entitled ‘To Ānanda’, a wanderer called Vacchagotta approaches the 
Buddha to ask him a question: 
‘Mr Gotama, is there a self (attā)?’ 
When this was said, the Blessed One remained silent. 
‘Mr Gotama, is there not a self?’ 
                                                 
2 Indian Buddhists denied the self in other ways besides these three. Most notably, the Abhidharmikas denied 
the self by systematically analysing experience into momentary real qualities called dharmas, leaving no 
room for either a metaphysical or an experiential self. There were also the Pudgalavādins or ‘Personalists’ 
who denied a permanent, unchanging ātman, but affirmed a pudgala or person who was more than the flux 
of changing constituents (studied by Priestley, 1999). 
3 Nāgārajuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 18.6: ātmety api prajñapitam anātmety api deśitam | 
buddhair nātmā na cānātmā kaścid ity api deśitam || (see also Siderits and Katsura, 2013). 
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A second time the Blessed One remained silent, and Vacchagotta the wanderer got up and 
left. Then, not long after Vacchagotta the wanderer had left, Venerable Ānanda said this to the 
Blessed One: 
‘Why, lord, did you not answer the wanderer Vacchagotta’s questions?’ 
‘Ānanda, had I, being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer, “is there a self?”, answered that 
the self exists, that would have been to agree with those ascetics and brahmanas who are 
eternalists. Ānanda, had I, being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer, “is there not a self?”, 
answered that the self does not exist, that would have been to agree with those ascetics and 
brahmanas who are annihilationists.  
‘Ānanda, had I, being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer, “is there a self?”, answered that 
the self does exist, would that be consonant with the arising of the knowledge that “all 
experiences (dhammas) are without self” (anattā)?’ 
‘Certainly not, lord.’ 
‘Ānanda, had I, being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer, “is there not a self?”, answered 
that the self does not exist, wouldn’t the bewildered wanderer Vacchagotta be even more 
confused, thinking, “I used to have a self, but now it doesn’t exist”?’4 
This delightful exchange, which surely must have always produced a smile, shows the Buddha 
explaining to Ānanda that his reason for neither affirming nor denying the existence of a self was 
not to mislead Vacchagotta into thinking that he taught a speculative or theoretical view regarding 
the existence or non-existence of the self – that is, concerning a metaphysical self, a self considered 
as existing as the object of a concept of the self – or not. 
It is instructive to notice that the reason the Buddha gives for not affirming nor denying a 
metaphysical self is not that such a self is an illusion, but that to affirm or deny it would be to take 
up eternalist or annihilationist views. Thinking more analytically, the Buddha did not affirm the 
metaphysical self for the reason that, like the son of a barren woman or the horns of a hare, the 
metaphysical self is non-existent. Elsewhere the Buddha argues that views like that of the 
metaphysical self are the thoughts that arise on condition of feeling (vedanā) and craving (taṇhā) 
but whose content, being merely overstimulated speculation, does not refer to anything.5 And the 
reason the Buddha did not deny the metaphysical self is that to do so would plunge the unwary into 
confused and unhelpful views, such as annihilationism.6 
Not only is the Buddha reported as not denying the self, but the self is implicitly or 
explicitly affirmed in much of his teaching. This self is not the supposed object of metaphysical 
views, but is the ordinary, everyday self or ‘person’ (puggala), a first-person perspective on 
personal identity through time, a person who acts and experiences the consequences of actions. 
Hence the Buddha is said to have recommended that all his followers reflect frequently as follows: 
                                                 
4 ‘To Ānanda’, Saṃyutta Nikāya (S) 44: 10 PTS iv.400–1; also translated by Bodhi (2000, pp.1393–4). 
5 ‘Brahma’s Net’, Dīgha Nikāya (D) 1 PTS i.40; also translated by Walshe (1987 pp.87–90). 
6 This interpretation is also rehearsed in Vasubandhu’s discussion of the same sūtra in his ‘Refutation of the 
Theory of the Self’ (Ātmavādapratiṣedha), an appendix to his ‘Treasury of Abhidharma’ (Abhidharmakośa), 
and translated by Duerlinger (2003, pp.90–1) and by Kapstein (2001, pp.363–4). 
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‘I am the owner of my actions, heir to my actions, born of my actions, related to my actions, 
and actions are my refuge; whatever actions I might do, good or bad, of these I will be the 
heir.’7 
Further, the Buddha taught the person as a continuing identity not only for the sake of ethical 
responsibility but also for the sake of making progress on the Buddhist path. For instance: 
‘Monks, for one who is virtuous and flourishing in virtue, the precondition of freedom from 
remorse is fulfilled. When there is freedom from remorse, for one of flourishing freedom from 
remorse, the precondition of joy is fulfilled…’8 
And so on, through the factors of the path, to liberation and knowledge of liberation. Hence, the 
Buddhist tradition from the beginning has clearly taught that persons are social agents enduring 
through time, who can develop towards awakening. Not only are persons social agents, but they are 
represented as having narratives, that is to say, stories which give meaning to an existence through 
time, narratives which change in the course of Buddhist training without being entirely destroyed. 
Even Buddhas have narratives, stories traced back over lifetimes, albeit rather impersonal ones. 
 But Buddhist persons are enjoined to consider the non-self characteristic of experience. The 
Buddha’s teaching of non-self has a specific place in the methodology of Buddhist training for 
liberating insight. This methodology consists of a investigation of actual experience, and the non-
self teaching is prescriptive guidance for what to observe. In the historical context of ancient India, 
some ascetics contemplated a homology or deep identity of the self in its proposed metaphysical 
essence with the cosmos, as taught in certain Upaniṣads;9 but the Buddha is recorded as deriding the 
presuppositions involved: 
‘But, monks, if the self and what belongs to a self is in actual fact not to be found, the 
following point of view: “The self and the world are the same, and after death I will be 
permanent, stable, eternal, of a nature not to change, and I will remain just so for ever” – is 
this not completely and utterly the doctrine of fools?’10 
As well as completely denying there is any point of looking for a a permanent, unchanging self, the 
Buddha is recorded as teaching a method for observing how all experience is non-self in the 
following way: 
‘Therefore, monks, whatever physical form [or feeling-tone, or perception, or formations, or 
consciousness] there is – past, future or presently arisen, internal or external, coarse or subtle, 
inferior or excellent, far away or nearby – all that physical form [and so on] should be seen 
                                                 
7 ‘Topics for Frequent Recollection’ Aṅguttara Nikāya (A) 5: 57 PTS iii.71–5: kammassakomhi 
kammadāyādo kammayoni kammabandhū kammapaṭisaraṇo yaṃ kammaṃ karissāmi kalyāṇaṃ vā pāpakaṃ 
vā tassa dāyādo bhavissāmi; also translated by Bodhi (2012, p.686). 
8 ‘Preconditions’ (Upanisā Sutta)’ A 10: 3 PTS v.4–5: sīlavato bhikkhave sīlasampannassa upanisasampanno 
hoti avippaṭisāro. avippaṭisāre sati avippaṭisārasampannassa upanisasampannaṃ hoti pāmojjaṃ; also 
translated by Bodhi (2012 p.1342). A parallel version of this discourse in the Mādhyama-Āgama (MĀ 46) 
survives in Chinese translation (Taishō 26 486a–b), translated in Bingenheimer, Anālayo, and Bucknell 
(2013, pp.324–5). 
9 See Norman (1991) for details of this historical reconstruction. 
10 ‘The Simile of the Water-Snake’ Majjhima Nikāya (M) 22 PTS i.138: attani ca, bhikkhave, attaniye ca 
saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne, yampi taṃ diṭṭhiṭṭhānaṃ ‘so loko so attā, so pecca bhavissāmi nicco 
dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo, sassatisamaṃ tatheva ṭhassāmī’ti nanāyaṃ, bhikkhave, kevalo paripūro 
bāladhammo’ti; also translated by Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995, p.232). 
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with right understanding as it actually is in this way: “this is not mine, I am not this, this is not 
my self”.’11 
This teaching is presented in what is traditionally regarded as the Buddha’s third discourse, given to 
his first disciples, and resulting in their gaining of awakening, suggesting the centrality of this 
method of contemplation for the Buddhist path. This method is not just one of observation, but of 
analysis, through which the disciple rehearses arguments to reach conclusions that result in further 
insight, such as the argument that if (by hypothesis) there was a permanent self (as taught by certain 
ascetics), then one should be able to control one’s experiences, but (by observation) one cannot, 
therefore (one reasons) there is no such self.12 
 The Buddha’s attention in these arguments to ‘me’, ‘mine’ and ‘my self’ is to the 
experiential self, our ordinary everyday sense of self as we experience it. The arguments are not 
strictly rational disproofs, but invitations to investigate experience directly, and to reproduce a train 
of thought that leads on to liberation. In other discourses, the constituents, meaning the psycho-
physical processes of unawakened beings, are described as ‘masses of appropriation’ (upādāna-
khandhā). Clinging or appropriation (upādāna) is the ‘making one’s own’ of the psycho-physical 
processes which make up the entirety of experience, which the Buddha describes as arising 
dependent on beginningless ignorance (avijjā) and craving. The most important feature of 
appropriation is the belief in the self, that is, the belief that the experiential self is real (sakkāya-
diṭṭhi). The appearance in awareness of this self is the sense of ‘I am’, as well as thoughts about past 
and future, that arise through the process of proliferation (papañca): ‘“I am” is a proliferation, “I 
am this” is a proliferation”, “I shall be is a proliferation”’.13 The process underlying the 
proliferation of these thoughts is ego-identification (ahaṃkāra), which arises dependent on the 
underlying tendencies (anusaya) of the mind to ignorance, sense-pleasures, craving and views. The 
aim of the Buddhist life is hence the calming of proliferation and the giving up of appropriation, 
which comes about through a gradual training and the development of insight. 
 This training results in a radical alteration in the ordinary and familiar sense of self, and its 
replacement by a direction awareness of causation or dependent-arising (paṭicca-samuppāda) as the 
basic way in which experience works. Something of the flavour of this change is suggested by the 
following short discourse: 
‘Monks, a practitioner’s consideration of six good consequences will quite suffice to establish 
in them the generalised perception of non-self in all the constituents of experience. What six?  
[1] I will not identify with anything in the world. 
[2] All my ego-identification (ahaṃkārā) will cease. 
[3] All my identification with me and mine (mamaṃ-kārā) will cease. 
[4] I will gain unique knowledge. 
[5] I will have seen causation (hetu) well 
                                                 
11 ‘The Not-Self Characteristic’ S 22: 59 PTS iii.68: tasmātiha, bhikkhave, yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ 
atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ 
dūre santike vā, sabbaṃ rūpaṃ ‘netaṃ mama, nesohamasmi, na meso attā’ti evametaṃ yathābhūtaṃ 
sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ; also translated in Bodhi (2000 p.902). 
12 Earlier in ‘The Not-Self Characteristic’ S 22: 59 PTS iii.66, in Bodhi (2000 pp.901–2). 
13 ‘The Sheaf of Barley’, S 35: 248 PTS iv.203: ‘asmī’ti, bhikkhave, papañcitam etaṃ, ‘ayam aham asmī’ti 
papañcitam etaṃ, ‘bhavissan’ti papañcitam etaṃ. Also translated by Bodhi (2000 p.1259). 
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[6] and causally-arisen phenomena.’14 
The perception of non-self (anatta-saññā) is described here not in terms of the denial of the self, or 
in terms of the self being an illusion, but rather in terms of a different kind of experience, one that is 
no longer characterised by appropriation or the proliferation of thoughts concerning ‘I’ or ‘me’ or 
‘my self’. In this way the early Buddhist texts negotiate the relationship of the non-self teaching to 
the ongoing narrative life of the person. 
 Moreover, awakened beings appear to continue to inhabit a first-person perspective on the 
world, distinguishing themselves from others just like everybody else, and continuing to use 
personal pronouns and linguistic expressions referring to themselves. However, this use of language 
is said to be an unconfused employment of conventional communication. Hence the arahant or 
Worthy One is described as follows:  
‘That wise one has overcome the belief in their own thoughts: 
they might say, “I say such-and-such”,  
they might say, “They said this to me” –   
they are experts in the ordinary, they know the common tongue;   
they might use such words, but to communicate, not more.’15  
Here is the deep difficulty in presenting the non-self teaching in early Buddhism. The teaching 
implies that the metaphysical self is non-existent, and the teaching evidently involves giving up 
ego-identification through insight into the non-self character of experience, a deep transformation of 
the experiential self; yet this insight does not mean that awakened beings do not refer to ‘I’ and 
‘me’. This teaching is difficult to understand and easy to misunderstand, and for this reason the 
Buddha is said to have been reticent when talking about it to those, like Vacchagotta, who were not 
his disciples. Later Buddhists, seeking to engage in debate in the religious culture of India, 
developed new ways to explain the Buddha’s teaching of non-self, and consequently of the precise 
meaning of denying the self. 
 
The Chariot Argument for the non-existence of the self 
 
The first way of denying the self I will consider is through what I will call the ‘Chariot Argument’, 
as found in the Milindapañhā, or ‘Questions of King Milinda’, an anonymous post-canonical work 
of Buddhist literature preserved in Pāli. This work presents the conversations of a monk called 
Nāgasena with a certain King Milinda, who is based on the historical figure of king Menander, who 
reigned over a Bactrian Greek kingdom during the 2nd. c. BCE.16 King Milinda approaches 
Nāgasena, and asks who he is. The monk replies that he is called Nāgasena, but that this is a 
conventional expression, a verbal designation, a customary usage, since: ‘here, a person (puggala) 
                                                 
14 ‘Not Identifying’, A 6: 104 PTS iii.444: cha, bhikkhave, ānisaṃse sampassamānena alam eva bhikkhunā 
sabbadhammesu anodhiṃ karitvā anattasaññaṃ upaṭṭhāpetuṃ. katame cha? sabbaloke ca atammayo 
bhavissāmi, ahaṅkārā ca me uparujjhissanti, mamaṅkārā ca me uparujjhissanti, asādhāraṇena ca ñāṇena 
samannāgato bhavissāmi, hetu ca me sudiṭṭho bhavissati, hetusamuppannā ca dhammā. Also translated by 
Bodhi (2012 p.984). 
15 ‘The Worthy One’, S 1: 25 PTS i.14: sa vītivatto maññataṃ sumedho | ahaṃ vadāmī’ti pi so vadeyya | 
mamaṃ vadantī’ti pi so vadeyya | loke samaññaṃ kusalo viditvā | vohāramattena so vohareyya. Also 
translated by Bodhi (2000 p.102). 
16 Details in Norman (1983, p.110). 
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is not to be found’.17 Nāgasena’s claim then, for which he will argue, is that the self or person is 
merely a name; he denies that self is anything other than a verbal designation.  
 The king, meanwhile, mounts an argument that denies the consequence of Nāgasena’s 
claim. He asks Nāgasena who it is who practises ethics or not, and who experiences the results of 
karma, if no person is to be found; questions which the early Buddhist texts answered in terms of an 
implicit ‘person’. He asks Nāgasena whether the hair is Nāgasena, whether the nails, teeth, bones 
and the other parts of the body are Nāgasena, whether physical form, feeling-tone, perception, 
habits or consciousness is Nāgasena. The monk denies that any of these constituents is Nāgasena; 
nor that together they are Nāgasena; nor that there is Nāgasena apart from the constituents; and the 
king concludes provocatively that the monk has lied: ‘Who here is Nāgasena? Good sir, you utter 
false speech, a lie. There is no Nāgasena.’18 Since this is untrue, the king implies, Nāgasena’s denial 
of the self must be false. But the king’s argument has assumed that the self must either be identified 
with one or more of its components, or exist apart from them. This, it will turn out, involves the 
subtle mistake of thinking of the self as existing in the same kind of way as its parts, and then 
discovering that such a self does not exist.19 
 Nāgasena now asks the king whether the chariot on which he arrived is the pole, or the axle, 
or the wheels, the frame, or the flagstaff. King Milinda says no, it is none of those things separately. 
But nor is it all these things together. But nor is there a chariot apart from all these. Therefore, 
concludes Nāgasena, ‘chariot’ is just a sound and the king is lying, for no chariot can be found. The 
king now understands the mistake in his argument, and says this to Nāgasena: 
‘Nāgasena, good sir, I do not speak falsely. That which is called a chariot exists as a 
conventional expression (samaññā), a verbal designation (paññatti), a customary usage 
(vohāra), a mere name (nāma-matta), dependent on a pole, an axle, wheels, a frame and 
flagpole.’ 
‘Excellent, your majesty; you understand a chariot. Likewise, your majesty, in my case, that 
which is called Nāgasena exists as a conventional expression, a verbal designation, a 
customary usage, a mere name, dependent on hair, blood, and so on, up to, dependent on the 
brain in the head, and dependent on physical form, feeling-tone, perception, determining 
factors and consciousness. In this respect, a person in the ultimate sense (param-attha) is not 
to be found. Your majesty, Vajirā the nun said this in the presence of the Blessed One: 
“Just as, from an arrangement of parts,    
There is that for which we have the word ‘chariot’,  
Likewise when the constituents exist,    
There is what we call a ‘person’.”’    
                                                 
17 Milindapañhā (Miln) 2.1 PTS 25: na h’ettha puggalo upalabbhatī’ti. Also translated by Horner (1963 
p.34). This section of Miln is also translated by Peter Harvey with a philosophical commentary in Edelglass 
and Garfield (2009, pp.272–4). 
18 Miln 2.1 PTS 26: ko pan’ettha nāgaseno, alikaṃ tvaṃ, bhante, bhāsasi musāvādaṃ, natthi nāgaseno’ti. 
Also translated by Horner 1963 p.36.  
19 The argument is discussed by Garfield (2015 p.107), who nicely characterises it as a ‘parody of an 
Abhidharma reductive analysis’.  
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‘Extraordinary, Nāgasena, good sir; marvellous, Nāgasena, good sir! You have answered the 
questions put to you brilliantly. If the Buddha were here, he would applaud you. Excellent, 
excellent, Nāgasena. You have answered the questions put to you brilliantly.’20 
We could summarise this conclusion as follows. The self or person does not really exist (‘in the 
ultimate sense’), but the self or person exists as a convention or linguistic fiction dependent on the 
arrangement of parts upon which causal basis this conventional self arises.21  
 But how brilliantly has Nāgasena really answered the king? How, for instance, does this 
way of denying the self help us understand ethical responsibility? Let us rehearse the argument:  
Premise 1: What is called a chariot is made up of parts.  
Premise 2: Something made up of parts is merely a name for the sum of its parts. 
Conclusion 1: Therefore, ‘chariot’ is merely the name for an assembly of parts.  
And by analogy: 
Premise 3: What is called a person is made up of parts.  
Conclusion 2: Therefore, ‘person’ is merely the name for an assembly of parts. No person in 
the ultimate sense exists.  
The Chariot Argument has an appealing formal validity. The conclusion that no person in the 
ultimate sense exists should be taken to mean that no person exists apart from the fictional person 
who is dependent on an assembly of parts, and this conclusion logically follows from the premises. 
But when we look at the canonical verses that Nāgasena quotes, we might begin to doubt the 
argument on methodological grounds. In context, Vajirā the nun is said to utter these verses in 
response to Māra, who asked her some hair-raising existential questions about her origin and 
destiny while she was meditating alone.22 Such a spiritual practitioner had evidently already 
established the perception of non-self in her awareness, and the argument for the merely nominal, 
non-ultimate, existence of the person was a reminder of the non-existence of the metaphysical self 
rather than a rehearsal of the method required to perceive the not-self characteristic of experience. 
The English bhikkhu, Ñāṇavīra, evokes the problem with Nāgasena’s argument nicely by 
noticing that, should one accept the argument and suppose that one understands the non-self 
teaching, then: ‘The unwary thinker comes to believe that he understands what, in fact, he does not 
understand, and thereby effectively blocks his own progress’ (Ñāṇavīra 2010, p.40). The thinker 
may believe that they understand the non-self teaching, but in fact they only understand the non-
existence of the metaphysical self, and not the experiential self, which is what one actually needs to 
understand to make progress. The Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti had in fact made a similar point 
about Nāgasena’s argument some centuries before Ñāṇavīra. He argues that, while one may indeed 
understand the non-existence of the metaphysical self once one has come to understand the non-self 
characteristic of experience, that metaphysical self was never the basis of the ego-identification, 
which is a proliferative appropriation, which is the problem with the experiential self. He appears to 
allude ironically to Nāgasena, whom king Milinda had said had argued brilliantly (aticitra): 
When there is an understanding of non-self, a permanent self is rejected, 
                                                 
20 Miln 2.1 27–8. Also translated by Horner (1963, p.37–8). 
21 This argument is discussed in Garfield (2015. p.108). 
22 ‘Vajirā the Nun’, S 5: 10 PTS i.134–5: athā hi aṅgasambhārā | hoti saddo ratho iti | evaṃ khandhesu 
santesu | hoti satto’ti sammuti. Also translated by Bodhi (2000 p.230). 
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but we do not accept that this [permanent self] is the basis of ego-identification. 
If someone says that they have uprooted [ego-identification] from their own philosophical 
view 
by knowing the non-existence of the [permanent] self – that is very brilliantly said.23 
Candrakīrti goes on to make a comparison, which nicely illustrates the problem that Ñāṇavīra had 
observed in Nāgasena’s chariot argument: 
[To suppose that] seeing a snake which has gone into a hole in one’s own home 
one could remove one’s terror by saying, ‘there’s no elephant in there!’, 
and also abandon the fear that is because of the snake – 
well, so much for [our] opponent’s so-called sincerity.24 
His point is that, just as one might prove logically that there is no elephant in the room, Nāgasena 
might have managed to convince king Milinda that the metaphysical self is non-existent, but it is 
surely naive to suppose that disproving the existence of the elephant will help anyone allay the very 
real difficulties of having a snake living in one’s living room, that is, the unsatisfactoriness that 
comes from the appropriative and proliferative tendencies of the experiential self. 
 It turns out, therefore, that Nāgasena’s chariot argument fails properly to distinguish the 
metaphysical from the experiential self, that is, an idea about the self from the actual experience of 
being a self, and obscures the real significance of investigating the non-self characteristic in favour 
of scoring a cheap victory over the non-existent metaphysical self.25 Perhaps there is some value in 
this, but most contemporary westerners do not believe in a metaphysical self of the sort that 
Brahmanical traditions in India teach. 
 Indeed, contemporary western thinking tends more towards annihilationist views. In the next 
two sections of my essay I turn to the very different approaches to denying the self found in two 
Indian Buddhist philosophers, Vasubandhu and Candrakīrti. The approach is my own version of an 
argument made by contemporary philosopher Evan Thompson (2015, pp.356–66). He is concerned 
among other things, to correct a contemporary annihilationist view that he calls ‘neuro-nihilism’: 
the opinion of certain neuroscientists that, since there is no way the neural structures of the brain 
can support a self, conceived as independently existing, there is no person or subject at all 
(Thompson, 2015, p.322).26 This is much like disproving the existence of the elephant, in 
Candrakīrti’s simile. Let us try to grasp the snake. 
 
Vasubandu’s argument that the self is a mistake 
 
Vasubandhu (4th c. CE), author of the Abhidharmakośa, or ‘Treasury of Abhidharma’, is said to 
have converted to Mahāyāna under his brother Asaṅga’s influence, and then to have composed 
some dense and poetic texts which set out the Yogācāra viewpoint in its essence, such as the 
                                                 
23 Candrakīrti, Madhyamakāvatāra (MA), 6.140, trans. from the re-discovered Sanskrit text ed. Xuezhu 
2015: nity ātmā ca kṣipyate ’nātmabodhe nāhaṃkārasyāśrayaś cāyam iṣṭaḥ | ātmābhāvajñena kiṃ tat 
svadṛṣṭer utkhātaś cety ucyate’tīva citram ||. The phrase ati eva citram echoes the Milindapañha’s aticitra. 
24 MA 6.141: paśyann ahiṃ chidragataṃ svagehe gajo ’tra nāstīti nirastaśaṅkaḥ | jahāti sarpād api nāma 
bhītim aho hi nāmārjavatā parasya ||. 
25 Collins (1982, pp.182–5) argues that the Milindapañha’s argument makes the self a ‘linguistic taboo’, and 
non-self a dogmatic assertion, a sociological parallel to Candrakīrti’s and Ñāṇavīra’s soteriological concern. 
26 The argument of the following two parts of this essay, focussing on Vasubandhu and Candrakīrti, were 
suggested by Thompson (2015, pp.356–66). 
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Triṃśika, or ‘Thirty Verses’.27 A basic tenet of this viewpoint is that of vijñapti-mātra or 
‘cognition-only’,28 the view that the appearance to consciousness of mind-independent external 
objects is fundamentally an appearance of duality within a real but non-dual awareness in which 
appear cognitive representations such as objects and the self. This not the denial of external objects, 
but the argument that their appearance depends on consciousness. In the Thirty Verses, Vasubandhu 
employs this view to show that the experiential self is a cognitive error, and that what we take to be 
the self is really something else. Although this sounds like reductionism, it is a ‘soft’, indeed very 
positive, kind of reductionism, since the real causal basis to which the erroneous appearance of the 
self is reduced is the completely perfected nature of non-dual awareness. 
 The approach Vasubandhu takes to the self is comparable to Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology.29 Husserl characterises the everyday viewpoint of the average person as the 
‘natural attitude’, a kind of naive realism based on the unreflective assumption of the existence of 
an external world which is perceived by a conscious subject or self who is identical through time. 
We could think of the Buddhist term sakkāya-diṭṭhi as meaning such a naive realist view of the 
self.30 To gain a truly philosophical knowledge of reality, according to Husserl, one needs to carry 
out the ‘phenomenological reduction’. This means deciding to bracket or suspend one’s usual 
assumptions and to commit oneself to a radical enquiry into the conditions for experience, upon 
which basis any knowledge is possible. 
 For phenomenology, as for the Yogācāra thinkers, the first discovery one makes when one 
questions one’s assumptions in this way, a discovery which changes everything from that moment 
onwards, is that everything in experience is an appearance to consciousness and in consciousness. 
By ‘consciousness’ here we do not mean the power of thought conceived as dependent on the brain, 
capable of various operations like remembering, imagining, and so on, but rather the quality of 
awareness, which is to say, the presence of phenomena, without which experience would be 
completely unthinkable. On the basis of this fundamental appreciation of the reality of non-dual 
awareness, Vasubandhu develops a way of conceptualising the coming into being of self and world 
as we ordinarily know it. 
 The Thirty Verses begin with a setting out of basic terms: 
The figurative expressions ‘self’ and ‘phenomena’ which function in various ways 
are the transformations of consciousness.31 (1) 
That is to say, what we experience as ‘subjectivity’ or the self (ātman), and the objective world with 
its objects (dharma) are transformations (pariṇāma) of that consciousness (vijñāna) which as 
awareness (jñāna) is non-dual. These transformations have three aspects. Firstly, consciousness 
manifests a transformation into the store-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), a repository of past actions 
which are unconsciously appropriated. That is to say that past actions, in the form of traces or 
                                                 
27 Introductions to Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra and translations of the Triṃśika in Kochumuttom (1982, pp.127–
63); Anacker (1984, pp.181–90); Lusthaus (2002, pp.274–350). 
28 Also known as citta-mātra, ‘mind-only’, and vijñāna-vāda, ‘theory of consciousness’; I will call the 
viewpoint ‘cognition-only’ as this is the term used in the Thirty Verses. 
29 See e.g. Husserl (1964, lecture 1). 
30 The term sakkāya is usually translated ‘personality’ or ‘identity’, but this is makeshift. Gombrich (2003) 
argues that sakkāya means ‘category (kāya) of existence (sat)’, and that the background reference is to the 
Vedāntic ontology of really existing ultimates. In western terms, sakkāya means ‘naive realism’. 
31 Triṃśika (trans. from the critical ed. by Hartmut Buescher available via GRETIL) (1): ātma-dharma-
upacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate | vijñāna-pariṇāmo’sau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā |. 
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impressions are represented in the store as ‘mine’ – one experiences this root-consciousness as 
one’s own. The store-consciousness simply is the ongoing individualised stream of cognitive 
representations that make up the appearances of my self and the world around me. It is attended by 
the universal mental events that go along with all manifestations of consciousness: contact, 
attention, feeling-tone, perception and intention. (2–4) 
 Based on this store-consciousness, the second transformation of consciousness manifests, 
the mind (manas), which is based on the store and has the characteristic of thinking. There is a 
phenomenological appeal here to our ordinary experience of being conscious. In ordinary 
unawakened experience, we tend to identify with our thoughts. To the extent that this thinking 
activity is based on the unconscious appropriation of past actions which are continually ripening 
into new content, this thinking is experienced as one’s own and constitutes the content of our sense 
of self. Indeed, this thinking, which is afflicted by its unconscious basis, continually manifests as 
self-view, self-delusion, self-conceit and self-love. This mind, called the afflicted-mind-
consciousness by the Yogācārins, is not a permanent aspect of experience, but may cease during 
deep meditative states. (5–7)  
 The third transformation of the non-dual perfected nature of awareness is the six sense-
consciousnesses. In the encounter of consciousness with the world, and based on the store-
consciousness as well as the afflicted mind, arise the three feeling-tones (pleasant, painful and 
neither) and the various wholesome and unwholesome mental states which which we may be 
familiar from the Abhidharma traditions (8–14). It is not as though the transformation of 
consciousness into, for instance, heedlessness around food, or faith towards the Buddha, is unreal. 
But rather it is an appearance, that arises on conditions and cannot be separated from those 
conditions: 
The five consciousnesses come into existence according to causes, either together or not, 
upon the root-consciousness like waves upon water.32 (15) 
The metaphor of water (the store-consciousness) and the waves upon it (sense-consciousness), 
which are not separate, though they may appear so, is taken from earlier Mahāyāna sūtras.33 
 Let us now characterise the appearance of the everyday or experiential self, according to this 
Yogācāra analysis. Firstly, the word ‘self’ (ātman) is a metaphorical expression (upacāra), that is, a 
way of naming a certain kind of appearance in consciousness. What appears is the sense of the 
‘mineness’ of conscious experience based on the background unconscious appropriation (upādi) of 
past actions in the store (ālaya). Supported by the constant stream of ripenings of action there is a 
thinking mind (manas) which, unbeknown to its own thinking and prior to paying conscious 
attention, takes for granted a sense of self belonging to the  appropriative activity of the store. On 
the basis of this sense of self based on appropriation, the mind proliferates the inner content of our 
representation of a self, in terms of self-view (ātma-dṛṣṭi), self-delusion (ātma-moha), self-conceit 
(ātma-māna) and self-love (ātma-sneha). The five senses plus the mind-sense continue to 
experience a world of objects and thoughts which appear to the self constituted by the mind and the 
store. 
 But the appearance of self and world are the results of the transformations of consciousness. 
In truth: 
                                                 
32 Triṃśika (15): pañcānāṃ mūlavijñāne yathāpratyayam udbhavaḥ | vijñānānāṃ saha na vā taraṅgāṇāṃ 
yathā jale |. 
33 Especially the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (trans. Suzuki 1932, p.40 etc.). 
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This [threefold] transformation of consciousness is the imagination of duality. What is 
imagined 
by it does not exist. Therefore all this is cognition-only.34 (17) 
The second half of the Thirty Verses consists in the explanation of appearances, from the point of 
view of non-dual awareness (jñāna). This is not phenomenology so much as a way of formulating 
the Dharma. It is simply how it is that, from beginningless time, as a matter of fact, consciousness is 
characterised by its underlying tendency towards a duality of distinguishing grasping (graha) and 
grasped (grāhya): 
While consciousness does not [yet] remain in the state of cognition-only, 
the underlying tendency towards the two-fold grasping does not cease to function.35 (26) 
But while the imagination of duality is the normal state, it is possible through meditation and study 
to rest in a state in which there is no grasping or grasped: 
But when awareness no longer perceives an object, then 
it rests in being cognition-only: since if there is no graspable there is no grasping of it.36 (28) 
Vasubandhu emphasises that such a resting in appearances is not the result of merely understanding 
the idea of ‘cognition-only’, but is rather the result of the practice of the Buddhist path as a whole: 
This supramundane awareness is without intentional thought or perception. 
It is the revolution of the basis, the removal of the two-fold badness [namely, the veil of 
afflictions and the veil of views].37 (29) 
Indeed, this resting in cognition-only is not anything other than the Dharmakāya (30). 
 We can now use Vasubandhu’s the distinction of three ‘natures’ (svabhāvas) to fully explain 
what it is to experience a self (20–25). The ‘completely imagined nature’ (parikalpita-svabhāva) is 
the way that the self appears as a first-person subject who is distinct and separate from objects and 
subject to affliction. The ‘other-dependent nature’ (paratantra-svabhāva) is the way that the self 
appears as arisen on conditions, namely, as the pre-attentive mind’s thinking based on the 
unconscious appropriation of the traces of past actions in the store. The ‘completely perfected 
nature’ is the way that the figurative expression ‘self’ lacks any nature of its own, being entirely 
dependent on conditions, and as otherwise completely imagined. 
 In his ‘Treatise on the Three Natures’, Vasubandhu illustrates his analysis of these three 
natures with the example of a illusory elephant: 
It is as if [something] made by magic from the power of mantra appears in the form of an 
elephant. 
                                                 
34 Triṃśika (17): vijñānapariṇāmo ’yaṃ vikalpo yad vikalpyate | tena tan nāsti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ 
vijñāptimātrakam |. 
35 Triṃśika (26): yāvad vijñaptimātratve vijñānaṃ nāvatiṣṭhate | grāhadvayasyānuśayas tāvan na  
vinivartate |. 
36 Triṃśika (28): yadā tv ālambanaṃ jñānaṃ naivopalabhate tadā | sthitaṃ vijñaptimātratve grāhyābhāve 
tadagrahāt |. 
37 Triṃśika (29): acitto ’nupalambho ’sau jñānaṃ lokottarañ ca tat | āśrayasya parāvṛttir 
dvidhādauṣṭhulyahānitaḥ |.  
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It is only an appearance and there is no elephant at all.38 (27) 
It is interesting to consider what we are doing when we imagine an illusory elephant. We are using 
our power of imagination, the innate nature of consciousness, to imagine an elephant that is 
conjured up by a spell out of some planks of wood. We are being asked to compare our own 
immediate experience of being a self with this imagined illusory elephant: 
The imagined nature is the elephant; the other-dependent [nature] is its appearance. 
The completely perfected [nature] is the non-existence of the elephant there.39 (28) 
We might say that our ordinary experience of being a self is right there, perhaps big and rough. But, 
following our philosophical analysis, we appreciate that it is an appearance, which arises dependent 
on causes and conditions, such as ignorance, appropriation and proliferation, those underlying 
tendencies of the mind to literalise what appears. We have learned from Vasubandhu, however, that 
the basic reality of consciousness is a store or stream of personalised arisings, taken at face value 
and imagined to be a self by the thinking mind: 
Thus, the imagination of the unreal appears in the form of a duality because of the root-mind. 
There is absolutely no duality there. There is only its appearance.40 (29) 
The root-consciousness is like the mantra. Thusness is understood as like the wood. 
The imagination of duality should be considered like the appearance of the elephant. Duality 
is like the elephant.41 (30) 
The experiential self is connected to our tendency to believe in what is arising from the store, which 
can be compared to a kind of spell. Under the influence of this spell, what is actually there, the stuff 
of consciousness that is comparable to something impersonal like wood, appears in the form of a 
big beast, which is ‘me’. This self is the assumption that the duality of subject and object is as real 
as an illusory elephant. 
 According to Vasubandhu, therefore, the experiential self is a mistake, an erroneous 
imagining of a person on the subjective side of the subject-object duality. This mistake is both 
convincing and inevitable, given the underlying tendency of consciousness to undergo 
transformation into the store, the mind, and the six sense-consciousnesses. There is no question of 
undoing such a mistake through philosophical argument alone, though the reasoning involved may 
be sufficient disenchantment to prompt the revolution of the basis through deep meditation. 
 
Candrakīrti’s dialectical denial of the self 
 
One can admire the subtlety with which Vasubandhu has constructed a sophisticated explanation of 
the process by which the ordinary experience of being a self operates, and also shown how it can be 
seen as a mistake. But if we think about Vasubandhu’s method, we might begin to see that it 
                                                 
38 Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (TSN), (trans. from the ed. by Anacker on GRETIL) (27): māyākṛtaṃ mantravaśāt 
khyāti hastyātmanā yathā | ākāramātraṃ tatra asti hastī nāsti tu sarvathā |. 
39 TSN (28): svabhāvaḥ kalpito hastī paratantrastadākṛtiḥ | yas tatra hastyabhāvo’sau pariniṣpanna iṣyate |. 
40 TSN (29): asatkalpas tathā khyāti mūlacittād dvayātmanā | dvayam atyantato nāsti  
tatrāstyākṛtimātrakam |. 
41 TSN (30): mantravan mūlavijñānaṃ kāṣṭhavat tathatā matā | hastyākāravad eṣṭavyo vikalpo hastivad 
dvayam ||. 
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involves two logically distinct claims.42 One (set out in the first half of the Thirty Verses) is a 
descriptive phenomenology of the transformations of consciousness, which provides a vivid 
account of how a minimal sense of self arises and persists. The other (in the second half) is an 
explanation of these transformations in terms of a soteriological appeal to non-dual awareness, 
accessible perhaps  through meditation or insight. The denial of the self in terms of its being an 
error depends on taking these two claims together. But if we separate the phenomenology from the 
soteriology there are two separate claims: 
(1) The experiential self has a phenomenology which shows how speaking of the separate 
appearance of ‘I’ and ‘me’ distinct from the world of objects is metaphorical. 
(2) The experiential self is the transformation of non-dual awareness, which is real. 
Separating the two claims like this shows up how the Yogācāra approach involves a metaphysical 
commitment. It has been said in its favour that the Yogācāra affirmation of the reality of mind 
avoids the sense of nothingness that the Madhyamaka can engender in the temperamentally 
nihilistic. But let us test our mettle in emptiness. 
We turn to Candrakīrti’s denial of the self, to be found in his Madhyamakāvatāra, or 
‘Introduction to the Middle Way’, a general introduction to Nāgārjuna’s ‘middle way’ 
(madhyamaka) approach.43 In his denial of the self in the Madhyamakāvatāra, Candrakīrti (6th c. 
CE) does not rely on any kind of metaphysical models or beliefs about pure awareness, such as we 
find in Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra. He simply accepts commonly-accepted Buddhist doctrines, 
drawing out their consequences to invoke in his reader an appreciation of the middle way. 
What Candrakīrti, following Nāgārjuna, calls the ‘middle way’ is pratītya-samutpāda or 
dependent arising, the meaning of which they take for granted since they are addressing other 
followers of the Buddha, who taught it. They also assume a distinction between conventional 
(samvṛti) and ultimate (paramārtha) truth (satya), a distinction which, though implicit in the early 
Buddhist texts, was only fully drawn out by the Abhidharmikas, who claimed that their lists of 
dharmas were existent in an ultimate sense, while much of the content of the sūtras contained 
teachings about people and events having a merely conventional existence. The Mādhyamikas 
maintained this distinction. To quote Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā or ‘Fundamental Verses 
on the Middle Way’: 
The Dharma-teaching of the Buddhas is based on two truths: 
The conventional truth of the world and that which is ultimate.44 
But they thought it through in a radical way that both goes back to the Buddha and states it anew. 
Conventionally, phenomena arise from causes and conditions; they exist as dependently-arisen; 
their nature (svabhāva) is dependent on other phenomena. Ultimately, phenomena do not exist apart 
from causes and conditions; their nature is empty of anything independent. The secret of 
Madhyamaka is understanding the subtle interplay between the conventional and the ultimate: 
We declare that dependent arising is emptiness, 
                                                 
42 I here develop the argument made by Thompson (2015, p.359), citing Ganeri (2012 ch.8). 
43 Candrakīrti originated what came to be known as prāsaṅgika-madhyamaka, ‘consequentialist middle 
way’. A prāsaṅga is a logical consequence, and the prāsaṅgikas presented their middle way philosophy 
entirely by drawing out the logical consequences of their interlocutors, which generally led to what they 
considered absurdities. 
44 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) 24.8: dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā | 
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ |. Also translated by Siderits and Katsura (2013, p.272). 
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which we use as a verbal convention. It is indeed the middle way.45 
The Mādhyamikas use emptiness as a verbal convention, in the sense that emptiness is not a 
concept that exists apart from the way everything in ordinary experience arises and ceases based on 
causes and conditions and hence lacks independent existence. Hence: 
The ultimate is not taught without recourse to the customary. 
Without understanding the ultimate, nirvāna is not achieved.46 
Indeed, since the ultimate truth is emptiness, which is a way of speaking that depends on the 
absence of independent existence of dependently-arisen phenomena, one can only make any sense 
of the ultimate by recourse to the study of the conventional, whose ultimate truth is its being empty.  
If one can accept dependent arising and the distinction between conventional and ultimate 
truths, which constitute a sort of minimalist metaphysical commitment, one can begin to follow 
Candrakīrti’s dialectical approach. It is the aim of his investigation to assist the reader in seeing 
through the problems caused by believing in the reality of the self: 
Through wisdom clearly seeing both defilements and faults  
that are wholly produced from the view that the self is real, 
and understanding the object of this [view] as being the self, 
the meditator makes a refutation of the self.47 
Discussing the Chariot Argument above, I quoted Candrakīrti in relation to the non-existence of 
what I called a ‘metaphysical’ self, which is the idea of a permanent self that exists apart from 
ordinary experience. His argument was that disproving such a self merely showed that it did not 
exist, while leaving untouched the self of ordinary experience, which the the Buddha diagnosed in 
terms of appropriation and proliferation. 
Hence Candrakīrti turns to our ordinary experience of being a person identical through time, 
with a past and future, and a present first-person point of view, and asks how this person, me, 
relates to its constituents. This is merely to ask how the person relates to the accepted Buddhist 
analysis of what constitutes the person, namely, physical form, feeling-tone, perceptions, 
formations and consciousness; which are what all Buddhists agree as a matter of convention to be 
what constitutes the person. Candrakīrti again takes up the example of the chariot for the sake of 
what he calls ‘the sevenfold analysis’, which is not a logical argument but a method of investigating 
experience:48 
It is not valid [to say] that a chariot is [1] other than its parts 
[2] nor not other [3] not does it possess them; 
[4] neither is it in its parts [5] nor are its parts in it 
                                                 
45 MMK 24.18: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe | sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva 
madhyamā |. Also translated by Siderits and Katsura (2013, p.277). 
46 MMK 24.10: vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate | paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ 
nādhigamyate |. Also translated by Siderits and Katsura (2013, p.273). 
47 MA 6.120: satkāyadṛṣṭiprabhavān aśeṣān kleśāṃś ca doṣāṃś ca dhiyā vipaśyan | ātmānam asyā viṣayaṃ 
ca buddhvā yogī karoty ātmaniṣedham eva |. Also translated by Duerlinger (2013, p.55), and by Huntington 
and Wangchen (1989, p.171). 
48 A practical meditative application of the ‘sevenfold analysis’ is described in Burbea (2014, pp.224–35). 
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[6] nor is it merely their collection [7] nor their configuration.49 
Likewise one can investigate one’s experience to confirm whether it true that: 
[1] The self is not other than the constituents (as one cannot conceive of being a person 
without the existence of the constituents; such a self is totally non-existent).50 
[2] The self is not the same as the constituents (as the constituents are plural and impermanent 
whereas the self is not like this; and nor is it a continuity like them).51 
[3] The self does not possess the constituents (since to do so it must be the same as or 
different from its constituents, as one ‘possesses a cow’ or ‘possesses a body’).52 
[4] The self is not in the constituents, 
[5] nor are the constituents in the self (since these relationships presume that the self and 
constituents are different, like curd in a bowl).53 
[6] The self is not the collection of the constituents (as simply putting together a collection of 
constituents does not make a self, which depends on the constituents).54 
[7] the self is not the configuration or arrangement of the constituents (like the parts of a 
chariot can be configured, as only physical form can be configured).55 
This method of analysis, when it is successful, may be dramatic in its results: 
Like those towering peaks are these 
long-enduring and immovable views that the self is real. 
The self is torn apart by the thunderbolt of awakening to selflessness. 
The mountain of philosophical views goes to oblivion too.56 
Let us review the method of denying the self involved here. Candrakīrti in no way doubts the way 
that in ordinary experience the self appears, though he attributes this appearance to confusion: 
The self is that which continually manifests to people, 
in which there is always the conviction of ego-identification, 
and that in which its comprehension of identifying with what is mine 
arises through confusion and from a lack of intelligent investigation.57 
                                                 
49 MA 6.151: svāṅgebhya iṣṭo na ratho yathānyo na cāpy ananyo na ca nāma tadvān | nāṅgeṣu nāṅgāny api 
tatra nāpi saṃghātamātraṃ na ca sanniveśaḥ |. Also translated by Duerlinger (2013, p.79), and by 
Huntington and Wangchen (1989, p.176). 
50 Discussed in MA 6.124–5. 
51 Discussed in MA 6.126–33. 
52 Discussed in MA 6.143. 
53 This and the previous analysis are discussed in MA 6.142.  
54 Discussed in MA 6.134–5. 
55 Discussed in MA 6.136. 
56 MA 6.145: etāni tāni śikharāṇi samudgatāni satkāyadṛṣṭivipulācalasaṃsthitāni | nairātmyabodhakuliśena 
vidāritātmā bhedaṃ prayāti saha tair api dṛṣṭiśailaḥ |. Also translated in Duerlinger (2013, p.88); 
Huntington and Wangchen (1989, p.175). 
57 MA 6.164: ayaṃ sa ātmā jagatāṃ pravṛttā yasmin ahaṃkāramatiḥ sadaiva | yat tasya tasmin 
mamakārabuddhir udeti mohād avicārabuddhyā |. Also translated in Duerlinger (2013, p.76); Huntington 
and Wangchen (1989, p.177). 
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This manifestation of the self, this conviction of an ‘I’ who identifies with consciousness, the body, 
and so on, appears in my awareness of myself to exist in itself. But when I investigate the basis for 
this conventional existence, relaxing the unquestioning ego-identification of ordinary life, I find that 
ultimately this self does not exist by itself, either ultimately or conventionally.  
 Nevertheless, Candrakīrti stresses that talking in terms of the self is unavoidable, since most 
people take the appearance of the self at face value, and since this is the basis of our ability to 
communicate with each other. Comparing self with a chariot: 
‘It has parts, it has components, it is a [grammatical] agent – 
just that is a chariot’ – this is human communication. 
It is what has proven to be an appropriate usage among people. 
One should not destroy the world’s proven conventions.58 
An awakened person should use of the proven conventions of worldly communication to make 
themselves understood and to relate to people, even though they no longer themselves take for 
granted any views about the self, but know that it does not exist. 
There is no need, on this account, to explain the appearance of the self by reducing it to 
something more deeply or truly real, from which it is supposed to arise, as does the Yogācāra 
account of the self’s arising out of the transformations of consciousness. While the self considered 
apart from ordinary experience is ultimately non-existent, the everyday self appears to exist. What 
is denied in Candrakīrti’s analysis is just that this ordinary sense of self exists in the manner in 
which it appears to exist, which is to say, as existing apart from what it depends on. One may learn 
to distinguish, at least in meditation, what appears as my self from how I appear. What appears is 
my experiential self that appears to exist independently, but how this self appears is dependent on 
ego-identification and the appropriation of the constituents. As one relaxes ego-identification and 
appropriation through such methods as the sevenfold analysis, one no longer takes how the self 
appears to be as what it appears to be. On lets go of the belief that I exist as I think I do.  
 
Why I think Candrakīrti has got it right 
 
While the Chariot Argument to show that no self can be found has a rhetorical appeal, being based 
on a clearly presented logical argument by analogy, it fails to fully convince. In Candrakīrti’s terms, 
it manages to show the non-existence of the idea of a self existing by itself – but this metaphorical 
self was never our problem. This analysis showed the difficulty in presenting a denial of the self, 
even when ‘establishing a general perception of non-self’ was a well-known way of putting the 
liberating Dharma. Vasubandhu’s denial of the self worked through the elucidation of an elaborate 
phenomenological analysis, which was then back-lit, so to speak, by the light of non-dual 
awareness, to allow him reduce the self to a beginningless self-sustaining mistake, made in the 
depths of the self-appropriating mind. But this account does not really allow us to sense why the 
Buddha is said to have continued to be able to use conventional expressions, to say ‘I’ and ‘me’ and 
‘my self’, just like everyone else, but without being fooled by them. If the Buddha’s mind had 
undergone a revolution at its basis, he must have been faking his use of personal pronouns. 
                                                 
58 MA 6.159: aṅgī sa evāvayavī sa kartā rathaḥ sa eveti jane niruktiḥ | siddho ’py upādātṛtayā janānāṃ mā 
saṃvṛtiṃ nāśaya lokasiddhām |. Also translated in Duerlinger (2013, p.83); Huntington and Wangchen 
(1989, p.177). 
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 But Candrakīrti’s approach denies the self only in the sense of denying that it exists in the 
manner that it appears to exist. While you and I may experience ourselves as robust subjective 
points of view, attached to our narratives, and identified with our egos, the rigorous dialectical 
examination of this appearance reveals its appearance to be dependendent on what is other than the 
self. These relations of dependence are themselves discernable only in the ongoing ordinary 
experience of being who we are. While this amounts to a perception of non-self, ordinary 
experience is no less a matter of using pronouns that refer to ‘I’, ‘me’ and ‘my self’. Candrakīrti, 
therefore, makes much more intelligible how the Buddha ‘expresses himself in ordinary speech 
without taking it literally’.59  
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